Preliminary Remarks
Looking at the rapid growth of the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) since the Blair-Chirac meeting of Saint-Malo in 1998 and in particular at the launch of several crisis management missions, starting at the beginning of 2003, one might ask, in the light of these experiences, whether and how this area of cooperation has corresponded to the "fusion theory", as "a dynamic product of rational strategies of European states faced with growing interdependencies and spillovers, furthered by the institutional logics of EU bodies" (Wessels, 1997) or whether, due to its strictly inter-governmental character, it might turn into a tool of fragmentation between policies, forms of governance and institutions.
In other words: which will be the appropriate analysis in the field of ESDP (now named, with the Lisbon Treaty ratified, Common Security and Defence Policy-CSDP) and, particularly, of crisis management operations?
a) The Fusion theory as a process of progressive Europeanisation of national instruments and procedures. b) Or, on the contrary, a marked tendency toward a growing fragmentation of the whole ESDPs' political and institutional system. We intend, therefore, to investigate on the experiences made in the field and on their consequences both in theoretical and institutional terms on ESDP, with the aim of testing our two potential analyses and contribute to the debate about the Fusion theory.
A full test of the fusion theory, in its application to ESDP, has not yet been carried out, even by W. Wessels,. But his considerations on the Union's external policies give us some indications. For example, in one of his first essays in June 1997 Wessels underlined that "the fusion within the EU must also be seen in light of alternative international setups; the EU has to compete with other arenas or ways of handling transnational and global problems", having NATO clearly in mind as a competitive, more efficient institution in the security field. This perspective of Wessels has radically changed in recent years either E -178 because of the difficulties encountered by NATO in redefining its post-Cold War mission, or in the light of the more consistent role of the EU in crisis areas. However, it remained unclear in 1997 whether "government-free competition on the 'market' could become another form of dealing with transnational problems outside one's borders". Wessels continued in 1997 by saying that "the role of the state, including its European extension, would thus been reduced". Hence he saw in 1997, from one side, a move of ESDP as a new security actor towards some forms of fusion, or, on the other side, a process still largely open to fragmentation and ad hoc coalitions of states outside the EU framework.
More recently (2005) ideal and/or typical instance of the trends predicted by fusion theory: legitimacy and functions are merged, while the office-holder is supposed to integrate several instruments and various procedures in a kind of hybrid function" (Wessels, 2005) .
In the area of European security one moves therefore from the uncertainties and the absence of instruments and procedures of 1997, just prior to the insertion of Article 17 (the Petersberg Tasks) into the Treaty of Amsterdam, to a situation that in 2005 signalled a leap forward in the institutional design of the EU, with the proposal to fuse the functions of the "Minister of Foreign Affairs/ The High Representative", the Community's authority on external relations, with those of the CFSP, including those relative to the ESDP, making one person responsible for both. Is this a victory for Fusion theory? Is it really true, that, even in a classic case of national sovereignties' domaine reserve, such as the ESDP has been, a merging between inter-governmental and Community methods has been brought about through the forces of circumstances and events?
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In attempting to answer this question it is necessary to analyse how the ESDP has developed in concrete terms during the last decade, in the light of Fusion theory.
Based on the studies conducted by Wessels during recent years, it can be stated that Fusion theory is grounded in three fundamental characteristics:
-It develops thanks to a dynamic process which over the course of time may find points of temporary equilibrium, but which in actual fact is destined to continual modification and institutional adaptation according to the circumstances and course followed by both internal and international events; -It is created through the progressive extension of EU competences and areas of intervention, both in functional and in geographic terms. New competences and new ranges of engagement beyond the EU borders are necessary elements to drive the fine tuning of Community and national decision-making processes, and to allow any consequent adaptation between the two; -It results from the acknowledgement of the Member States of their incapacity to occupy themselves individually with a given problem, either particular or general, judging it to be therefore the responsibility of some or all of the EU members.
These basic characteristics of fusion theory are easily applied to the ESDP and, in particular, to one of its principal policies of recent years: crisis management operations, originally described as one of the areas covered by the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) , to be confirmed in the Treaty of Nice (2000), elaborated later in greater detail in the European Strategy Security (ESS) paper by Javier Solana (2003) and, finally, recognised in the Lisbon Treaty (2009).
Dynamics
Few sectors of cooperation within the EU have experienced acceleration as rapid as that of the ESDP. In the few years since 1998, when Britain's and France's leaders decided E -180 in Saint-Malo to take the initiative to push their partners along the road to military cooperation, progress has been noteworthy.
There was a preparatory phase involving declarations, promises, and analysis of the capabilities and objectives (the Headline Goals) in the military and civil camps.
During the second phase (2002-3) the doctrinarian and strategic frameworks of the common threats to and responsibilities of the Europeans were defined.
Then, from 2003, concrete operations began, through the launch of civil and military missions, designed to prevent and manage conflict.
All this developed within the space of 5-7 years, and in a manner which was largely unexpected (Bonvicini-Regelsberger, 2007) . Initially, the meeting at Saint-Malo might have been considered to be one of the many attempts which were made from the beginning of the nineties, after the end of the Cold War, to give life to a European defence project. This objective was included in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, and repeated at Amsterdam, but it was never able to take off due to various political obstacles It was this time the force of events (the conflict in the Balkans, specifically in Bosnia at the beginning of the '90 th ) and external pressure on the EU (above all from the United States) which put the virtuous mechanism of cooperation into gear. But the final push came through the realisation of the limited military capacity of the Europeans, in this case wearing their NATO hat, to restrain the violence of the Serbian paramilitary forces in Kosovo (1998) . The fear of risking another genocide similar to that seen in Bosnia was a feeling widely shared by national public opinions in Europe, which considered the Union as the proper actor to take a rescue initiative. The limited European military operational capacity, which needed to be compensated for by the Americans and NATO with their bombardment of Serbia, was a shock to European public opinion.
This prompted the decision to begin a first analysis and definition phase, looking into the existing military capability of each individual EU Member State. It was aimed to define E -181 objectives which could be developed within the shortest possible time span. Out of this, the Headline Goals were developed . The combination of these decisions, seemingly unconnected, has served to boost the capacities at the disposition of the EU Member States, to define the objectives of peace missions, and to study the procedures and mechanisms required to render them operative.
The civil and military Headline Goals also constitute, together with the ESS from Solana, the conceptual-strategic base of the role of the EU as a global security actor, and help to define its identity.
It began, as we have seen, in the military field, with the first Headline Goals at Helsinki, and it was followed up in the civilian area at the European Council at Feira, and is significant how over times such decisions lead to a fusion of civil and military aspects. This act of coherence is due to the necessity of resolving problems of inter-pillar coordination, and to give substance to a concept of a European security based largely on a mix between the civilian and the military (Berger-Bartholomé, 2007) .
There is no doubt, therefore, that one of the main elements which have shaped the area of crisis management has been the political and procedural dynamics. It has also given life, as we will see further down, to a significant number of new decision mechanisms and procedures, changes which had not necessarily been foreseen by the relevant Treaties.
The dynamics have been evidenced in extraordinary bottom up institutional developments, the like of which has rarely been observed in other European integration sectors. We have, in effect, added a large push from below, which found its impetus in experience acquired in the field, and in the obvious necessity for the three different pillars to combine their competencies and experience in order to achieve the desired results. We will return to this argument later.
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Extension of the Competences
The extension of EU competencies and range of involvement of engagement is the second building-block on which the fusion theory is based. There is no doubt that the birth of the ESDP as a completely new area of EU responsibilities has significantly extended the political and competency spectrum of the EU. From the first definition on paper of the Petersberg Tasks at the beginning of the nineties, until l the first mission in the field at the beginning of 2003 (EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina) the movement toward a definition of new tasks has been particularly clear.
It is not for nothing that the theme of all recent institutional debates and of the reforms of the institutions as foreseen by Nice (2001) and Lisbon (2009) has mainly been about the EU as a new world protagonist and the definition of its role as actor on the international security stage. This is the current central challenge for the EU: its capacity to extend its traditional economic/commercial role to a more consistent foreign and security policy action. The EU High Representative Javier Solana is a supporter of this need to play a greater role, and in his ESS paper he proposes an all-points review of the emerging profile of an EU which increases its range of responsibilities, including those in the area of security (Solana, 2003) .
The ESS, in conjunction with the solidarity clause inserted in the Constitutional Treaty and later in the Lisbon Treaty (art. 222), defines the themes and threats that need to be confronted as a Union. In particular, it mentions the trans-national challenges that individual members have difficulty in confronting alone: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, State failure, and organised crime. It is clear that these are new areas of cooperation in which the EU has never before acted concretely, but which, under the pressure of external events, it is now obliged to take into consideration.
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The ESS imposes no geographic limits on European activities. Even if particular attention is given to the 'ring of friends', the bordering States, a direct EU responsibility in the rest of the world is not excluded.
A 
Inadequate Responses on the Part of Single Member States
Lastly, the third fundamental element of fusion theory derives from the realization that particular problems cannot be adequately and effectively responded to at the national level and that therefore the responsibility must be transferred to the level of Union cooperation. The foreign security of the EU can be regarded as a common responsibility for at least three main reasons:
The first is that the type of challenge to be confronted is by nature trans-national and that the national borders are not sufficient as protection: the challenges must be confronted collectively and require the use of Union's competencies and instruments. The observation that a single State is not in condition alone to face a crisis external to its own borders is one of the principal reasons for a push towards forms of cooperation that are more effective in action. Of course, the transition towards closer modes of cooperation has not always been immediate. On certain occasions it may first be necessary to put the ). There are good explanations for this evolution towards authentically 'common' missions: in the first place, national public opinion spontaneously tends to consider crisis foreign to national borders to be a multilateral responsibility, and, in the case illustrated, of the entire EU. In addition, this type of mission normally takes place under UN mandate, and therefore requires the formation of a coalition of States to make it acceptable and understandable on the part of the third State, the object of the mission. But the truly new element experienced by the Europeans in cases such as "Artemis" is that the responsibility for the mission is accepted not by a coalition of a group of States, but by the EU itself, which approves the launch of the mission via the procedure of a joint action, as provided in the Treaties.
The second ground for the development of the Union's ESDP is that other multilateral organs, the UN, NATO, and the OSCE among them, may not always be in a position to react on their own or in alternative to the EU: quite the opposite, we see more and more examples of a tendency on the part of other international organs to directly appeal to the EU to be either a substitute or to carry the co-responsibility in the management of certain crises. NATO, particularly, has ceased to be considered the only security instrument available to the Europeans. The example of the Balkans is typical, where the EU found that it needed progressively to take over from NATO, both because of the Union's consciousness of a more direct political responsibility on the part of the EU towards the region, and because the nature of the crisis, a combination of civil and military elements, rendered the EU the actor best suited to carry the mission forward (P. Cornish, 2006 ).
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The third reason concerns this last point; that the EU, much more than other multilateral institutions, has at hand the instruments best suited to confront the entire cycle of crisis management.
-Before the crisis, with civil policies and the diplomacy of conflict prevention -During the crisis, with the possibility of military deployment, of diplomatic pressure, and of human intervention -After the crisis, with long term development aid and peace-building policies.
For all three phases the EU has a variety of "civilian" instruments at its disposal: well tested 
The Consequences at the Institutional Level: a bottom up development
The push towards a role in crisis management for the EU and the manner in which the ESDP has developed in meeting these new responsibilities has led to an enormous complexity in the procedures and mechanisms of decision making.
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The bottom up institutional development which has characterized the birth and evolution of the ESDP and its missions as a crisis management actor has brought with it some interesting consequences;
-It has given life to a notable number of new instruments both in the civil as well as the military fields; within the institutional framework of the Political and Security and offices assigned to the task. In general, therefore, it can be claimed that the commencement of the crisis management missions has brought about a considerable proliferation of organs and procedures, making it extremely difficult to understand the decision making system of ESDP and to use it properly.
-It has created problems of coordination and efficiency within the single pillars (intra-pillar). There is no doubt that the new dimensions of EU foreign relations in the area of global security also create problems of consistency within their own areas of competence. In particular, as far as the civil aspects are concerned, there is a clear need for better coordination between the more significant of the Community's tools such as aid policy, trade, and humanitarian aid and development policy. These are extremely important in the reconstruction phase of post-conflict
States. Their effect is seen in the medium-and long-term. In fact, these tools represent the third phase of the entire crisis management cycle. The well organised and well-knit use of these policies is therefore essential in consolidating on the ground any success of a crisis management mission. The same goes for the other two pillars, the CFSP/ESDP and Justice and Home Affairs. Especially in the second pillar the coordination between joint positions, joint actions and crisis management missions in the field must be well-meshed in order to lend credibility and efficiency the EU interventions.
-And above all, the delicate theme of the consistency of actions and decisions between the pillars (inter-pillar) has needed to be confronted (Berger-Bartholomé, 2007) . This is the true challenge for the EU: that of presenting itself as a single E -189 Countries. Much hope is focused therefore on two developments: the CivMil Cell, specifically created in order combine civil and military aspects, and on new coherence procedures which will need to be tested in future missions.
-Lastly, making the picture even more complex, the new ESDP has created a necessity for a working partnership between national and EU procedures and resources. Within the ESDP, almost all resources at hand are in fact based on national resources which are then used in common for both civil and military missions. It is above all the theme of funding where the difficulties of using the Community budget are to be noted (Gowan, 2007) . 
The ESDP and the Fusion Theory
The political-institutional consequences of the development of the ESDP as 
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Wolfgang Wessels underlined the precariousness of the role: "as a result, supranational and intergovernmental elements are mixed in a complex set of provisions, while the proactive instruments at the Minister's disposal are rather limited in practice. The constitutional setup envisaged in the TCE thus places the office-holder in the middle of a vortex of strong inter-and intra-institutional tensions and pressures" (Wessels, 2005) .
Despite, therefore, a certain rationalisation of the decision-making system of the ESDP, which should come out of the difficult ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, many other institutional adjustments (once again, the concept of dynamism) are needed in order to balance the inter-governmental aspects with the supranational. Until then, Fusion theory will be applicable only partially to a sector of cooperation, the ESDP, that could potentially transform the EU into a global security institution with innovative and postmodern characteristics, but which might also lead toward a process of fragmentation in absence of a more coherent institutional set up.
Only time will show us whether the political and institutional experiences and innovations of recent years will bring us the positive results that fusion theory tends to predict..
The risk is that a mismanaged institutional process could again deliver models of fragmentation and of minimal integration: the role of the institutional figures foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty, not only that of the High Representative, but also that of an elected President of the European Council and of the Commission will be determinant in the future orientation of the EU towards the ambitious responsibilities required of a new actor in global security.
